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I. Executive summary 
This study examines US demand for ethanol produced in the Midwest and assesses how 
state policies that target ethanol demand affect biofuel and agricultural commodity markets. The 
focus of this report is on the representation of state-level demand for ethanol produced in the 
Midwest. The results are used in simulations of national market effects using the FAPRI–MU 
agricultural and biofuel market models. This representation of state-level ethanol demand leads 
to some conclusions. While not all of the conclusions are new, the results put numbers to several 
of these outcomes, as discussed in the text. 
 
 State policies to encourage ethanol consumption affect a minority of total US motor fuel 
demand now. Before taking into account the price effects of policy changes: 
 Existing support causes no more than a 10 percent shift in the US ethanol demand 
curve in any of the price combinations examined here. Effects are closer to 10 percent 
if the ethanol price is high and the petroleum price is low and if mandates are not 
relaxed. 
 If a supportive policy of the type used in some Midwestern states were applied in all 
50 states and the District of Columbia, then the quantity of ethanol demand could 
nearly double at high ethanol prices, but effects would be small at lower ethanol 
prices. 
 
  Broader effects on national biofuel and crop market of existing state policies may not be 
very large given the small share of the affected motor fuel markets in total demand. 
 Corn price is increased a small amount by existing policies and US total corn area 
planted may be 0.2 million acres greater. 
 The hypothetical case of support to ethanol demand in all states would lead to larger 
effects on all markets, raising corn area by 1.6 million acres if the petroleum price is 
high.  
 Spill-over into other commodity markets is apparent in generally higher prices and 
reallocation of area to corn, in particular from soybeans. The effects are larger in the 
hypothetical case of widespread support to ethanol use. 
 Ethanol imports are also price sensitive and are likely to respond as quickly as 
domestic production to rising prices. 
 
Results could be substantially different under alternative assumptions. For example, 
federal biofuel policies, the petroleum price, corn yields and trade are critically important. These 
simulations result from a particular representation that ignores certain important characteristics 
of markets. The representation can be improved as new information becomes available. 
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II. State policies to support ethanol demand 
 State policies to support ethanol demand include differential tax treatment and mandates 
requiring a minimum level of use or inclusion. Here, these policies are summarized. Other 
possible forms of support are not considered. Federal incentives are not addressed here, but are 
included in the representation of US markets used to simulate wider effects of these policies. 
Taxes 
State excise taxes for gasoline and gasohol are not always the same. According to one 
source, the rates paid on gasohol, or E10, are lower in several states (Table 1). This has 
implications for consumers, based on the underlying assumption is that excise taxes are passed on 
to consumers.  
 
Table 1. Gasoline taxes and gasohol tax exemptions, FTA 
 
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators (www.taxadmin.org/FTA/rate/motor_fl.html), 2008. 
The data above are supplemented by information from other sources that suggest more 
incentives are given to support ethanol demand. State sales tax exemptions and other tax 
reductions that target the retail price are drawn from the Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy (EERE) office of the Department of Energy (DOE) and from an annual report of the 
Tax on  Gasohol Tax on  Gasohol
Gasoline exemption Gasoline exemption
(cents per gallon) (cents per gallon)
Alabama 18 0 Montana 27 4
Alaska 8 0 Nebraska 23 0
Arizona 18 0 Nevada 24 0
Arkansas 21.5 0 New Hampshire 18 0
California 18 0 New Jersey 10.5 0
Colorado 22 0 New Mexico 17 0
Connecticut 25 0 New York 24.45 0
Delaware 23 0 North Carolina 30.15 0
District of Columbia 20 0 North Dakota 23 0
Florida 15.6 0 Ohio 28 0
Georgia 7.5 0 Oklahoma 16 0
Hawaii 17 1 Oregon 24 0
Idaho 25 3 Pennsylvania 30 0
Illinois 19 0 Rhode Island  30 0
Indiana 18 0 South Carolina 16 0
Iowa 20.7 2 South Dakota 22 2
Kansas 24 0 Tennessee 20 0
Kentucky 21 0 Texas 20 0
Louisiana 20 0 Utah 24.5 0
Maine 27.6 5 Vermont 19 0
Maryland 23.5 0 Virginia 17.5 0
Massachusetts 21 0 Washington 36 0
Michigan 19 0 West Virginia 32.2 0
Minnesota 20 0 Wisconsin 30.9 0
Mississippi 18.4 0 Wyoming 14 0
Missouri 17 0
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American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE).1 Special treatment may take the form of an absolute or 
relative reduction in tax rates (Table 2). Arkansas, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin reportedly assign 
taxes based on the energy or gasoline equivalent, leading to an assumption that there is a percent 
reduction in the tax on ethanol blends that reflects the lower energy of ethanol.  
These sources do not always agree. In combining these sources, preference is given to the 
exact exemption given by FTA. The reduction given to gasohol is applied to E10 and E85. 
However, if the ACE or EERE indicate that there is a demand or more of a demand incentive 
relative to FTA data, then the tax is reduced according to these alternative sources. Based on the 
interpretation of material in these sources, the end result is a reduction in the tax on E10 in 
eleven states (Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota and Wisconsin). The tax on E85 is lower than the gasoline tax in twenty states 
(those with tax reductions for E10 plus Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota and South Carolina). 
 
Table 2. Preferential tax treatment for ethanol blends, ACE and EERE 
 
Note: See Appendix 2 for sources. 
State mandates 
 State policies introduce another partly involuntary form of ethanol consumption, namely 
mandates (Table 3). Mandate information is drawn primarily from some of the same sources as 
information about relative tax treatment. Some mandates are only effective under certain 
conditions, often relating to in-state production of ethanol, and are ignored in this study. 
However, at least some of the state mandates included here are also contingent on conditions in 
some way, such as the price of ethanol relative to gasoline. Nevertheless, the mandates listed here 
                                                 
1 Exact references are available in an appendix. 
Relative reduction Absolute reduction Relative reduction Absolute reduction
E10 E85 E10 E85 E10 E85 E10 E85
(percent) (cents per gallon) (percent) (cents per gallon)
Alabama 0 0 0 0 Montana 15 15 0 0
Alaska 0 0 6 6 Nebraska 0 0 0 0
Arizona 0 0 0 0 Nevada 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 3.45 25.53 0 0 New Hampshire 0 0 0 0
California 0 0 0 0 New Jersey 0 0 0 0
Colorado 0 0 0 0 New Mexico 0 0 0 6.9
Connecticut 0 0 0 0 New York 0 4.25 0 0
Delaware 0 0 0 0 North Carolina 0 4.5 0 0
District of Columbia 0 0 0 0 North Dakota 0 0 0 22
Florida 0 0 0 0 Ohio 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 Oklahoma 0 0 1.6 1.6
Hawaii 4 4 0 0 Oregon 0 0 0 0
Idaho 0 0 2.5 2.5 Pennsylvania 3.45 25.53 0 0
Illinois 0 6.25 0 0 Rhode Island  0 0 0 0
Indiana 0 0 0 0 South Carolina 0 0 0 5
Iowa 0 0 2 2 South Dakota 0 0 2 12
Kansas 0 0 0 7 Tennessee 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 Texas 0 0 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 Utah 0 0 0 0
Maine 0 0 2.4 2.4 Vermont 0 0 0 0
Maryland 0 0 0 0 Virginia 0 0 0 0
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 Washington 0 0 0 0
Michigan 0 0 0 7 West Virginia 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 5.8 Wisconsin 3.45 25.53 0 0
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 Wyoming 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0
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are included in subsequent analysis without any flexibility. In some cases, a local mandate might 
lead to some assumed state-level mandate such as in the case of the treatment of the mandate in 
Portland, Oregon. 
 
Table 3. State mandates to use ethanol, by volume, for 2009 
 
Source: EERE and ACE, as described in text. 
Overall importance of state support for ethanol 
 State level support is summarized briefly before introducing the effects of state support to 
ethanol demand on total demand and subsequently on broader markets. In particular, the number 
of states that give some form of incentive to ethanol use and their share in US motor fuel use 
merits attention before considering how these policies affect markets (Table 4). Interpreting 
source material with a view that identifies the upper bound of support, 19 states provide some 
form of preferential tax treatment and some mandate is present in six states (or a city in one state). 
Removing duplicates, 22 states provide some form of incentive to ethanol use. Said differently, 
the upper bound is that more than two-in-five states provide some incentive for ethanol 
consumption. 
 These states accounted for one-third of US motor fuel use in historical data. Consumers 
in the 19 states providing tax incentives used about 28 percent of motor fuel bought in the US, 
and the 6 states with mandates used 9 percent. The share of motor fuel use in states offering a 
discount in total US motor fuel use falls to 8 percent if the states that provide a tax incentive for 
E85 use only, like New York, Illinois, New Mexico, and North Carolina, are excluded.  If 
expansion of E85 use is limited in the short run, then the tax incentives and mandates for ethanol 
use currently in place are applicable to only a small portion of motor fuel use. 
 
State Volume share
Iowa 10.0%
Minnesota 10.0%
Missouri 10.0%
Hawaii 8.5%
Oregon 2.5%
Washington 2.0%
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Table 4. Summary of which states have policy incentives and their share in motor fuel use 
 
Source: Summary of previously described policy data drawn from sources given in Appendix 2; 
data source for motor fuel use, and for other model variables, is given in Appendix 1. 
III. State fuel price calculations and ethanol demand model structure 
Overview 
The demand curves for ethanol produced in the Midwest trace out the relationship between 
quantities of ethanol consumed in each state (and DC) and a benchmark price. As such, there are 
two steps to this representation. 
1. Link benchmark ethanol and petroleum prices to retail prices. These links take into 
account any differentials in fuel taxes between ethanol and gasoline, as well as 
transportation and infrastructure costs. 
2. Simulate how demand responds to variations in relative price. The demand response is 
based on a comparison of retail prices in energy equivalent terms. Consumers are 
assumed to substitute one fuel type for another over a range of relative prices. 
 
The model of state ethanol demand is recursive on the basis of benchmark prices. The 
results are stylized but intended to represent the nature of US demand for ethanol 
produced in the Midwest for the next few years. 
Limits of the study 
Given the focus on demand, the model is not a market-clearing type. Prices are exogenous and 
ethanol supply is not relevant. The focus is not on whether or not the Midwest would supply a 
particular amount of ethanol at a particular price. Moreover, imported supplies are ignored, even 
State policy Fuel use (2004) State policy Fuel use (2004)
pref. tax mandate Total Share pref. tax mandate Total Share
 (bil. gal.) (percent)  (bil. gal.) (percent)
Alabama N N 2.55 1.9% Montana Y N 0.47 0.3%
Alaska Y N 0.28 0.2% Nebraska N N 0.81 0.6%
Arizona N N 2.69 2.0% Nevada N N 1.07 0.8%
Arkansas Y N 1.39 1.0% New Hampshire N N 0.70 0.5%
California N N 15.58 11.4% New Jersey N N 4.30 3.1%
Colorado N N 2.08 1.5% New Mexico Y N 0.94 0.7%
Connecticut N N 1.80 1.3% New York Y N 5.65 4.1%
Delaware N N 0.41 0.3% North Carolina Y N 4.28 3.1%
District of Columbia N N 0.14 0.1% North Dakota Y N 0.33 0.2%
Florida N N 8.26 6.0% Ohio N N 5.12 3.8%
Georgia N N 4.96 3.6% Oklahoma Y N 1.82 1.3%
Hawaii Y Y 0.44 0.3% Oregon N Y 1.50 1.1%
Idaho Y N 0.60 0.4% Pennsylvania Y N 5.16 3.8%
Illinois Y N 5.17 3.8% Rhode Island  N N 0.38 0.3%
Indiana N N 3.17 2.3% South Carolina Y N 2.53 1.9%
Iowa Y Y 1.54 1.1% South Dakota Y N 0.40 0.3%
Kansas Y N 1.28 0.9% Tennessee N N 3.01 2.2%
Kentucky N N 2.23 1.6% Texas N N 11.35 8.3%
Louisiana N N 2.20 1.6% Utah N N 1.01 0.7%
Maine Y N 0.70 0.5% Vermont N N 0.34 0.3%
Maryland N N 2.62 1.9% Virginia N N 3.90 2.9%
Massachusetts N N 2.82 2.1% Washington N Y 2.64 1.9%
Michigan Y N 4.86 3.6% West Virginia N N 0.84 0.6%
Minnesota Y Y 2.64 1.9% Wisconsin Y N 2.48 1.8%
Mississippi N N 1.58 1.2% Wyoming N N 0.30 0.2%
Missouri N Y 3.13 2.3%
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though imports may be an important supply source that competes with ethanol produced in the 
Midwest.  
 
The model represents short- and medium-run future ethanol demand. Results do not extend to 
the longer horizon. For example, the capability of consumers to adopt E85 is subject to limits 
associated with the size of the fleet of flex fuel vehicles and the pace at which E85 retail 
infrastructure can expand. Extrapolations beyond the next few years may be unwarranted as the 
center of ethanol locations may change, distribution of ethanol and ethanol-blend fuels may 
evolve, and the underlying policy structure may change. 
Representation of prices 
Benchmark price variables are: 
 PBE for the ethanol rack price for ethanol in Omaha and  
 PBO for the refiners’ acquisition cost of crude oil in dollars per barrel.   
These benchmark prices are linked to retail consumer prices for different fuels as  
 (1)  ERsisiiPADDWEsiEOsgsgsiOsi TCTTCTCPBSPBSPR  ,,,,,,1,0,,, *])()*([  . 
The retail price of each retail fuel i in state s (of which the District of Columbia is an 
element) is a function of the benchmark prices. Fuels are gasoline without ethanol, fuel in which 
ethanol is an additive, E10 in which ethanol constitutes 10 percent of the fuel by volume, and 
E85 with up to 85 percent ethanol by volume. 
Each fuel is derived from the weighted sum of its ingredient fuels, with weights equal to 
the shares of gasoline and ethanol in volume terms, SO,i,s and SE,i,s.2  
The link from benchmark petroleum price to price of gasoline before taxes is estimated 
from historical data to estimate parameters that govern that link, αgo,s and αg1,s. This regression is 
based on the benchmark petroleum price and on gasoline price data from 1985 to 2007, extended 
one year based on the first 6 months of 2008.3 The partial data for 2008 are used in the regression 
with a view to facilitate extrapolation outside the price ranges observed over the preceding years.4 
The petroleum price is expressed on a per gallon basis by dividing by 42. Estimated values have 
intuitive meaning: the intercept is a constant margin between petroleum price and before-tax 
retail gasoline prices; and the slope indicates the increase in pre-tax gasoline prices for each 
increase in the petroleum price, both expressed in cents per gallon (Table 5). The average 
constant is $0.32 per gallon and the slope parameter implies that a $1.00 increase in the 
petroleum price causes an average increase of $1.13 in the retail gasoline prices before taxes. 
Incidentally, estimated links from the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price to these 
before-tax gasoline prices over a shorter time period for which data are available give similar 
results, with average intercept 0.35 and slope of 1.12. 
A similar relationship between the benchmark ethanol price and retail ethanol prices 
before taxes cannot be estimated because data are too few. Instead, 2002 data relating to the costs 
of ethanol shipments between regions, TCW,PADD, are used, but updated by one-tenth of the 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that the average inclusion rate of ethanol in E85 is 74 percent based on the “Annual Energy 
Outlook” of 2007 by EIA (www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/appa.pdf). 
3 EIA data are available at tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_allmg_a_EPMR_PTA_cpgal_a.htm.  
4 Several alternative regressions were explored with an additional term besides the petroleum price, but 
were discarded because of problems of endogeneity or implausible results for certain ranges of petroleum 
prices. 
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percent change in petroleum price in intervening years.5 A constant markup in ethanol price to 
reflect factors other than taxes and transportation costs is imposed, and is assumed to be $0.12 
per gallon.6 
 
Table 5. Intercept and slope parameters linking gasoline prices to benchmark petroleum price 
 
Source: Estimated parameters, as described in text. 
 
 
Taxes and tax credits are assumed to be passed on to final consumers. This is a critical 
assumption for this analysis. In theory, blenders could capture the tax reductions intended to 
support ethanol demand. If blenders operate in an uncompetitive environment, then they may 
opt to pocket the tax incentives rather than lower consumer prices. In that case, these taxes 
intended to increase consumer willingness to buy ethanol would instead lead be to increase in 
blender profits without affecting consumer prices or quantities. If blenders compete, however, 
then they will be forced through competition to use the taxes to lower consumer prices. This 
representation is apparently consistent with other researchers who assume that the federal tax 
credit is not captured by fuel blenders. Other circumstantial evidence includes the fact that 
equations linking gasoline prices to petroleum prices indicate strong pass-through of prices and 
the fact that policy makers opt to encourage demand by support given initially to blenders. 
The federal tax credit provided to fuel blenders per unit of ethanol used, C, is subtracted 
from the benchmark ethanol price. The value of this tax credit is 51 cents per gallon through 
2008, and is then set at 45 cents per gallon as set out in the new US farm bill, the Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. The retail price for each fuel blend includes federal and 
state fuel taxes for the fuel type, Ti and Ti,s.  
                                                 
5 Raw data are from Technical and Management Services, Inc., and were generated for Downstream 
Alternatives, Inc., but are taken here from the reproduction available in the EIA’s “Review of 
Transportation Issues and Comparison of Costs for a Renewable Fuels Standard,” September, 2002. These 
data report the transportation costs of shipping ethanol from the Petroleum Administration for Defense 
District (PADD) 2, which corresponds to the Midwest, to other PADDs. The PADD-to-PADD data are 
coarse relative to the 50 states, plus DC, representation used here. (PADDs composition is reproduced in 
an appendix.) The values used here are the average of all modes reported, namely truck, barge and rail.  
6 National Biodiesel Education Program. 
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope
Alabama 0.29 1.12 Louisiana 0.26 1.14 Ohio 0.29 1.13
Alaska 0.55 1.19 Maine 0.35 1.15 Oklahoma 0.25 1.15
Arizona 0.40 1.07 Maryland 0.29 1.14 Oregon 0.38 1.12
Arkansas 0.26 1.14 Massachusetts 0.32 1.14 Pennsylvania 0.28 1.13
California 0.35 1.16 Michigan 0.28 1.15 Rhode Island 0.32 1.11
Colorado 0.35 1.11 Minnesota 0.36 1.11 South Carolina 0.25 1.14
Connecticut 0.33 1.14 Mississippi 0.30 1.12 South Dakota 0.35 1.14
Delaware 0.29 1.13 Missouri 0.28 1.11 Tennessee 0.26 1.13
Florida 0.22 1.19 Montana 0.37 1.11 Texas 0.27 1.13
Georgia 0.28 1.13 Nebraska 0.31 1.12 Utah 0.33 1.10
Hawaii 0.24 1.16 Nevada 0.41 1.09 Vermont 0.36 1.16
Idaho 0.46 1.19 New Hampshire 0.35 1.13 Virginia 0.28 1.13
Illinois 0.35 1.12 New Jersey 0.34 1.10 Washington 0.36 1.12
Indiana 0.31 1.14 New Mexico 0.35 1.15 West Virginia 0.30 1.15
Iowa 0.29 1.12 New York 0.30 1.14 Wisconsin 0.31 1.14
Kansas 0.30 1.13 North Carolina 0.26 1.13 Wyoming 0.37 1.13
Kentucky 0.29 1.12 North Dakota 0.37 1.15 Average 0.32 1.13
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For purposes of simulating consumer demand, the retail fuel prices are compared in fuel 
efficiency terms. Each fuel price is converted into a gasoline equivalent. The conversion factor, 
γi,s, is fuel specific, and reflects the amount of ethanol in the fuel. A common element of the 
parameter for all fuels is the equivalence between ethanol and gasoline. Here, 65.5 percent is used 
as the energy content of ethanol as compared to that of gasoline.  
Retailing E85 leads to additional costs relative to the retailing costs of other fuels. An 
additional cost is added to reflect these infrastructure costs, TCER. Here, this potential for 
infrastructure costs is based on three casual observations or simple assumptions: the cost of 
installing an E85 pump is $50,000 according to industry experts; the average volume of sales per 
E85 pump is 7557 gallons7; and a three-year period in which to recover costs. This estimate is 
relevant if all E85 sold uses new E85 pumps. However, a better estimate for incremental costs 
would be zero. There seems little potential for such increases in retail distribution costs for 
relatively small changes in E85 distribution patterns from year to year. Thus, the additional retail 
costs are imposed gradually as E85 sales expand within a state and the full cost is applied only for 
very large increases in E85.8 
Base data reflect the case of 2004. More recent data are not consistently available at the 
time of model development. Data sources are summarized in an appendix. 
Results of mapping from benchmark price to retail price 
This representation of the link from benchmark prices to retail prices is by no means 
certain and may not be stable. The lack of historical data for estimation and the changing 
distribution network may undermine these calculations at least to some extent. Nevertheless, the 
links can be used to distinguish between price comparisons at benchmark prices and retail prices. 
In the representation of demand that will follow, consumers are assumed to make their judgments 
based on relative retail prices, including taxes, in fuel equivalent terms. 
These links are further illuminated by showing these comparisons in the case of both 
$140 per barrel petroleum and $70 petroleum (Table 6). First, the average prices of fuels based 
on the equations used here are shown. For example, a benchmark ethanol price of $2.00 per 
gallon and a $70 petroleum price imply that average retail prices of fuels, including taxes, 
transportation and E85 infrastructure costs, and relative energy content for gasoline, E10, and 
E85 are $2.61, $2.64, and $3.00 per gallon. At double the petroleum price, these average retail 
prices are $4.50 for gasoline, $4.41 for E10, and $3.82 for E85.9  
Increased prices for ethanol blended fuels follows from three factors. First, the higher 
cost of the gasoline component of these fuels which, for E10, comprises 93 percent in energy 
equivalent terms. Second, ethanol transportation costs are assumed to move proportionally with 
petroleum price, so a doubled petroleum price leads to double the costs of moving ethanol from 
the Midwest to other regions.10 Third, for E85 only, increasing use associated with changing 
prices leads to higher infrastructure costs.  
                                                 
7 Waterman, T. “There Are Several Ways to Increase Ethanol Demand, None of Which Is Easy.” Ethanol 
Monitor, vol. 3, no. 36: (Sept 17, 2007): p. 7. 
8 The determination of quantities demanded is described in the next section. 
9 While these estimates of gasoline prices are consistent with historical data, more recent events hint that 
they may be too high. Recent petroleum prices have been as high as the levels investigated here for a brief 
period of time, but the gasoline price has not risen as much as the estimated equations imply. 
10 The assumption that the evolution of costs is entirely proportional to the petroleum price almost 
certainly overstates the effects, and understates the potential for other cost factors that are invariant with 
respect to petroleum prices. Better and up-to-date data about ethanol transportation costs would be 
valuable. 
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If the combination of benchmark prices is $2.00 per gallon of ethanol and $70 per barrel 
of petroleum, then the average retail prices of both E10 and E85 are higher than the average 
gasoline price, taking into account taxes, margins, and energy content. On the other hand, if the 
petroleum price were $140 per barrel, then the E10 and E85 prices would be, on average, less 
than the gasoline price if the ethanol price were still $2.00. Looking at other calculations, the 
expected results hold in that a higher ethanol benchmark price will tend to decrease competitivity 
of ethanol blended fuels relative to pure gasoline. At the same time, a higher petroleum price 
tends to increase competitivity of ethanol blended fuels. 
 
 
Table 6. Calculated fuel price for varying conditions 
 
Source: Calculations based on data and model described in text. 
 A common question is at what price is ethanol competitive with gasoline. Here, this 
question can be addressed is explored by calculating the benchmark prices of ethanol and 
petroleum at which are retail prices the same (Table 7). The two benchmark prices cannot be 
compared directly to judge their value to consumers because (1) ethanol has less energy than 
petroleum and (2) consumers do not buy crude petroleum or, typically, ethanol at the plant gate. 
Supposing, for example, that the benchmark petroleum price is $140 per barrel, or about $3.33 
on a per gallon basis, there are several comparisons that can be made. These comparisons are 
listed below on the basis of national average prices, culminating in the most appropriate one for 
assessing the situation of consumers. The question this addresses is a common one, namely at 
what benchmark or indicator price of ethanol are the prices of this fuel source equal to the price 
of petroleum based fuel.  
1) The ratio of benchmark prices is one if the ethanol is $3.33 per gallon. 
2) The ratio of prices in fuel equivalent terms is one if the benchmark price of 
ethanol is 34.5 percent less than the benchmark petroleum price, or $2.22 per 
gallon. 
3) Retail prices: 
a. The ratio of E10 and gasoline in fuel equivalent terms and after taxes is 
one if the benchmark ethanol price is $2.61 per gallon.    
b. The ratio of E85 and gasoline in fuel equivalent terms and after taxes is 
one if the benchmark ethanol price is $2.84 per gallon. 
In short, for consumers to opt to buy ethanol in the form of blended fuels, the benchmark 
price of ethanol must be lower than the $3.33 per gallon petroleum price. For the price of E10 to 
be competitive with gasoline, on average, requires that the Omaha rack price of ethanol is 15 
percent lower than the price per gallon of petroleum.  
Ethanol price Petro. Price Average retail price Ratio of retail prices
Gasoline E10 E85 E10/Gas E85/Gas
 (per gallon) (per barrel) (per gallon, energy basis)
$1.50 $70 $2.61 $2.59 $2.54 99% 97%
$140 $4.50 $4.36 $3.40 97% 76%
$2.00 $70 $2.61 $2.64 $3.00 101% 115%
$140 $4.50 $4.41 $3.82 98% 85%
$2.50 $70 $2.61 $2.70 $3.50 103% 134%
$140 $4.50 $4.46 $4.23 99% 94%
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Price comparisons vary by level, wholesale or retail. The reasons include the averaging of 
prices among states. More substantive explanations are the combination of constant and relative 
mark-ups, including the effect higher petroleum price is assumed to have on ethanol 
transportation costs. Also, there is a relative shift caused by the lower energy content of ethanol 
versus the largely constant tax differentials. The end result is that, based on this treatment of 
margins and taxes, the benchmark ethanol price at which ethanol can compete in retail markets 
can be higher or lower than the benchmark ethanol price that implies direct equivalence with the 
benchmark petroleum price. 
A common back-of-the-envelope calculation is to go from a particular petroleum price 
and estimate an equivalent ethanol price without going through retail prices (Table 7). This is 
reproduced as follows. First, the given petroleum price is used to calculate the wholesale gasoline 
price before taxes based on historical relationships.11 Taking this price, times 65.5 percent, gives 
the price at which ethanol would need to be priced to offer the same energy content per dollar. 
The next adjustment is to add the blender tax credit, 45 cents per gallon, to see the price that a 
fuel blender would be willing to pay for ethanol. The result is an estimate of the Omaha rack 
price of ethanol that corresponds to the petroleum price, which is $1.81 in the case of $70 per 
barrel petroleum and $3.08 in the case of $140 per barrel petroleum.  
 
Table 7. Fuel price comparisons and equivalent price calculations 
 
Source: Calculations based on data and model described in text. 
These back-of-the-envelope calculations overstate the benchmark ethanol price that is 
competitive with the petroleum price by $0.19 or $0.24 per gallon, which is 8 or 12 percent, as 
                                                 
11 The rack price of unleaded gasoline in Nebraska (www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html) is estimated as a 
function of the refiner’s acquisition price of petroleum.  
Equivalent prices based on retail prices simulated here
Petroleum price (per barrel)
  Benchmark price, in dollars per barrel $70 $140
(per gallon)
  Benchmark price, in dollars per gallon $1.67 $3.33
   ‐‐> Equivalent benchmark ethanol price $1.67 $3.33
Retail, with transportation and taxes, common energy content
  Average gasoline price $2.61 $4.50
   ‐‐> Equivalent benchmark ethanol price
     Equivalence of gasoline and E10 price $1.62 $2.84
     Equivalence of gasoline and E85 price $1.58 $2.80
Back of the envelope: direct from petroleum to wholesale ethanol, without retail
(per barrel)
Given petroleum price $70 $140
(per gallon)
Estimated rack gasoline price in Omaha $2.08 $4.01
Multiply by energy content (65.5%)
   Equals energy equivalent retail price $1.36 $2.63
Add tax credit for blenders (45 cents per gallon)
   Equals rack equivalent $1.81 $3.08
Difference: back‐of‐the‐envelope versus E10 above
  Absolute $0.19 $0.24
  Percent 12% 8%
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compared to calculations based on the retail prices of fuels. One important difference between 
these two approaches is in the treatment of taxes: the back-of-the-envelope calculation presumes 
that taxes are proportional (expressed in percent terms), whereas most tax data found for purposes 
of this study are specific (expressed in cents per gallon).  
Based on such calculations, an analyst might infer a break-even corn price. This is the 
corn price for a given petroleum price at which ethanol processors are willing to buy corn and 
will make neither losses nor profits, taking into account costs of capital. This is a further 
extension of back-of-the-envelope calculations that are conducted here in these steps. First, the 
ethanol price calculated above is taken for each case, with petroleum price at $70 or $140 and the 
results based on either retail price comparison of direct links at wholesale level. Second, costs of 
ethanol production are subtracted. These costs are assumed to be 90 cents per gallon if the 
petroleum price is $70 per barrel (30 cents for energy-related costs, 30 cents for other operating 
costs, and 30 cents for capital costs) and $1.00 per gallon if the petroleum price is $140 (40 cents 
for energy-related costs, 30 cents for other operating costs, and 30 cents for capital costs). This 
gives the net return per gallon, apart from feedstock costs. As a third step, the net returns are put 
on the basis of bushels of corn by multiplying by ethanol yield per bushel, which is assumed to be 
2.75. This would be the break-even price except for the coproduct of ethanol production, 
distillers grains and solubles, whose price has historically been linked to the corn price. Fourth, 
the value of distillers grains is computed. This is taken to be a price, which is assumed to be 80 
percent of the break-even price before distillers grains and solubles, times a quantity per bushel 
of corn used to make ethanol, which is assumed to be 17 pounds per 56 pound bushel used. 
 
Figure 1. Implications for Break-Even Corn Price Calculations 
 
 
In this way, the petroleum price implies a competitive ethanol price which implies in turn 
a competitive corn price. The break-even corn prices calculated using retail prices simulated here 
are lower than the break-even corn prices calculated using the direct, back-of-the-envelope 
calculation described above (Figure 1). The difference is $0.65 per bushel, or 26 percent, if the 
petroleum price is $70 per barrel and $0.82 per bushel, or 13 percent if the petroleum price is 
$140.  
Apart from establishing the link from benchmark to retail prices necessary to assess 
consumer demand, this section results in one conclusion. In applied research, relative prices have 
been gauged using relative wholesale prices times some correction for energy equivalence. But 
adding in taxes and transportation costs that have fixed components do not support this method 
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because the ratio of benchmark prices at wholesale may not reflect the ratio of retail prices. 
Moreover, if correct then a comparison of relative benchmark prices cannot be rendered accurate 
simply by choosing a coefficient that represents adjustments for margins, taxes, and energy 
content. A single coefficient could only be used to correct the comparison at one point, and 
would consequently not be useful in the context of changing prices, if this representation of the 
links from benchmark to equivalent retail prices is structurally correct.  
Representation of consumer demand 
The representation of consumer demand for motor fuel takes into account five potential 
outcomes. 
1. Consumers may have the choice to buy gasoline without any ethanol, and may choose 
this option. 
2. In some areas, local regulatory requirements may lead consumers to buy fuel in which 
ethanol serves the role of additive to change certain properties.  
3. Consumers may be able to choose to buy fuel in which ethanol is blended at a 10 percent 
inclusion rate. 
4. Consumers with flex fuel vehicles may have the option to buy E85, fuel in which ethanol 
inclusion can be as high as 85 percent, and might choose to do so. 
5. Consumers may opt to buy more or less motor fuel overall. 
 
This model is intended to represent, in a stylized way, all of these possible outcomes, with 
consumer decisions motivated by relative prices within a regulatory context that may preclude 
some options. 
 The representation proceeds in stages. First, total motor fuel demand is a function of the 
average fuel price. The own-price elasticity for every state is -0.05 by assumption on the basis of 
literature review and comparison to structural model elasticity reported by the EIA. This 
elasticity implies a very small consumer response to motor fuel prices overall: a 1 percent increase 
in the average motor fuel price will lead consumers to buy 0.05 percent less motor fuels. 
 Total motor fuel is disaggregated in stages, first between E85 and other fuels, second, the 
non-E85 fuels are disaggregated between E10 and other fuels, and, third, other fuels are divided 
into gasoline and fuels with ethanol as an additive. This stylized representation is intended to 
reflect consumer choice in broader fuel types that are subject to greater limits, namely the option 
to buy E85 if the consumer owns a flex fuel vehicle, before the lower-stage decision with greater 
flexibility. 
 The E85 or non-E85 choice depends on relative prices. The assumed relationship in 
aggregate for any given state is one of smooth transition from non-E85 fuels to E85 fuels as the 
relative price of E85 falls (Figure 2). Historical data do not provide a basis for understanding 
broader acceptance, nor for putting precise numbers to this transition. It is assumed that 
widespread adoption would begin if the relative retail prices were equal, after taking into account 
energy content and taxes, and the consumer willingness to substitute E85 for other motor fuel 
would rise in the theoretical case that the price fell towards zero. This expansion is subject to a 
sharp limit in this representation based on the E85 fleet in existence at the time of writing and an 
assumed expansion path. The maximum E85 potential rises to 10 percent of total motor fuel use 
in 2009.12 
                                                 
12 The level is applied on a state-by-state basis. Useful exercises to explore sensitivity with respect to this 
parameter might include not only varying this parameter, but also changing the allocation among states to 
  17
 
Figure 2. Consumer choice between E85 or non-E85 
 
 
 Historical data reveal that E85 was used in all states in 2004 even though relative retail 
prices averaged at the state level would not favor this motor fuel over its competitors, at least by 
these calculations. However, the comparison of relative retail prices in equivalent terms is fully 
appropriate for all consumers only if the chief and perhaps only criterion when buying fuel is the 
cheapest way to move a car a mile. A broader array of consumer preferences may be manifested in 
their motor fuel purchases. Consumers may opt to buy ethanol-blend fuels based on any of a 
longer list of perceived outcomes of their fuel purchases that relate to farm income, fuel imports, 
environment quality, rural economic health, or driving performance. To capture the role of 
consumers who tend to buy E85 even when its cost of providing motor fuel services is higher 
than for competing fuels, a small share of the E85 demand is assumed to be much less price-
sensitive. At most, these consumers are assumed to account for one percent of motor fuel use 
(SE=1). That level only occurs if retail prices are equal (RE=1). The upper limit these consumers 
are willing to pay for E85 relative to other fuels (RH) is calibrated to observed 2004 data. 
 Non-E85 fuels are disaggregated in a second stage (Figure 3). The basis of consumer 
choice is assumed to be the ratio of E10 to non-E10 prices. It is assumed, moreover, that 
consumers will opt entirely for one or the other of these two fuels. The ratio at which E10 use is 
adopted is 0.85 for states that require that ethanol be labeled if used in such fuels and 0.925, 
otherwise (RL=0.85 or  RL=0.925). The upper limit (RH) is calibrated to 2004 data. Unlike the case 
of E85, E10 use is not reported in all states in the base period, so the upper limit is calibrated 
based only very loosely on calculated relative prices in other states. Mandates at the state level are 
imposed here by adjusting the E10 share to make sure total ethanol use achieves the share of 
overall motor fuel use required. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
allow for greater use in some states relative to others to mimic the possibility that E85 expansion is 
extremely centralized. 
Price of E85 / 
Price of other fuels
100%
Share of E85 in total fuel
RE
RH
SMax
SE
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Figure 3. Consumer choice between E10 or non-E10 
 
 
 The final disaggregation of fuel that is neither E85 nor E10 is not a matter of consumer 
choice, in a certain sense. Fuel sold in certain areas or at certain times was required to be 
oxygenated or reformulated in 2004 as required by the Clean Air Act, 1990 As Amended. In 
contrast to conventional fuel, these fuels have additives included to change certain properties. 
Two subsequent changes to the legal and regulatory environment are critical to assessing the 
evolution of the role of ethanol. First, MTBE was a common additive until 2006, from which 
point it has fallen into disuse as regulations no longer shield MTBE users from litigation brought 
about by its cancerous nature. Additive requirements are now met almost exclusively by ethanol. 
The second change is that the national requirement for additive use is no longer in effect, 
although local requirements typically remain. 
 To extrapolate beyond the 2004 base period, the share of fuel with additives in that year 
is assumed to remain constant into subsequent years. This may overstate the additive market. 
The share of ethanol in additive fuels is assumed to be 10 percent in all markets except California 
at least through 2009.13 This use of ethanol might be considered involuntary, because motor fuel 
consumers in some areas or at some times may face a smaller array of choices, all of which 
include ethanol. Technically, of course, consumption is voluntary as consumers could opt not to 
buy motor fuel at all, although the small overall elasticity of motor fuel demand suggests that this 
is not a common consumer choice. 
IV. State ethanol demand model results 
The recursive model is simulated for ranges of ethanol prices to generate the demand for 
ethanol at a given petroleum price. For each case, however, the model is extrapolated forward to 
2009 as a first step based on observed prices until 2008, expected prices in 2008, and the prices of 
the experiment in 2009. 
                                                 
13 EPA data indicate that 10 percent is commonplace 
(www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/fuels/rfg/properf/rfgperf.htm) so this inclusion rate is applied almost universally. 
The sole exception is California, where legal provisions suggest that the appropriate assumption is 5.7 
percent ethanol in additive fuels (Western Farm Press, “California Moves to Increase Ethanol Use”, 
www.westernfarmpress.com/news/082907-ethanol-increase/index.html, August 29, 2007). 
Price of E10 / Price 
of non-E10
100%
Share of E10 in the sum of E10 and non-E10
RH
RL
  19
Ethanol demand 
The cases of $70 and $140 per barrel petroleum in 2009 are used as examples to highlight 
some structural elements (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Given each of these prices in turn, the ethanol 
price is varied over a wide range to simulate possible levels of use given the stylized 
representation described above. These results highlight certain characteristics of fuel use and 
ethanol demand which, while not new, are put to numbers using this stylized approach. 
 The inelastic portion of the demand curve at near or over five billion gallons of ethanol 
use reflects the sum of additive use and state-level mandates.  
 The growth of additive use decreases overall elasticity of demand for ethanol because 
most additive fuel also has 10 percent ethanol so there is little cause for consumers to 
substitute between additive fuel and E10. 
 The range of ethanol prices over which E10 and E85 use expand is very sensitive to the 
petroleum price.  
 The “blend wall” is caused by the natural limit of ethanol penetration in the form of E10 
to 10 percent of total motor fuel use, and the imposed limit to the E85 share.  
 A reduction in the benchmark petroleum price from $140 to $70 leads to about 10 
percent less ethanol demand at extremely high or low ethanol prices, but can lead to a 
decrease in ethanol demand of just under 30 percent for mid-range ethanol prices. 
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Figure 4. Ethanol demand, petroleum price $140/barrel 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Ethanol demand, petroleum price $70/barrel 
 
State ethanol demand policy scenarios 
 The effects of state policies are explored in various scenarios for the two different prices.14 
First, the existing policies are removed for all states, such that there is no differential taxation in 
any state and there are no mandates. Second, a certain set of policies is extended to all states. The 
preferential tax treatment of the scenario is at least $0.10 for E10 and E85. The scenario mandate 
                                                 
14 The effects of national policies are not changed. The federal mandates are ignored at this point, but 
added later in the context of a complete US ethanol market representation. 
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is at least 5 percent in energy equivalent terms, or almost 8 percent in volume terms. In cases 
with greater mandates or discounts in ethanol-blended fuel taxes, the base levels are not changed. 
The results are summarized as follows (Figure 6 and Figure 7).  
Eliminating state support 
 If the petroleum price is $140 per barrel, then the results of eliminating state-level 
support have their greatest impact at higher ethanol prices, but in any case the relative impact is 
small. The case of no policy support, which amounts to the case that state-level differential tax 
treatment is discontinued and there are no state mandates, results in a reduction in the quantity 
of ethanol used at any given price that ranges from -1 to -5 percent relative to the base case of 
existing policies. The states that currently apply policies that encourage ethanol use do not 
account for a large share of the aggregate US motor fuel demand, as shown above, so their ability 
to induce greater total US ethanol use is limited.  
The effects are particularly small when the ethanol price is low. In that case, much of the 
potential ethanol use in these states is exhausted and mandates are less likely to be binding, so 
there is very little effect on consumer behavior from either mandate or tax. In contrast, at higher 
ethanol prices the mandates tend to cause greater consumption than would occur otherwise. 
Simulations not shown here indicate that state mandates explain a less than half of the effect of 
overall state support to demand at a low ethanol price, but these mandates explain almost the 
entire effect of state support at higher ethanol prices. 
The results of eliminating state support for ethanol use reflect the lower willingness of 
consumers to buy ethanol-blended fuels if the petroleum price is $70 per barrel, but are only 
somewhat larger in scale. Removing state support for ethanol demand lowers the quantity of 
demand by -1 percent at a low ethanol price and -7 percent at a higher ethanol price. The 
mandate effects are, again, most pronounced at a high benchmark ethanol price. Given the lower 
petroleum price in this case, however, a rising ethanol price would look high to consumers much 
more quickly than if petroleum costs $140 per barrel.  
Widespread state support  
 The implications of the alternative case in which all states offer at least a certain absolute 
reduction in the excise tax per gallon and required that ethanol comprise at least 5 percent of 
motor fuel use also has little effect at low ethanol prices and more substantial effects at higher 
prices. If prices are low, then consumers in many states might already use 5 percent ethanol or 
more in their motor fuel consumption. However, at higher ethanol prices, the mandate is more 
likely to matter. In the event of extremely high prices, the outward shift in ethanol demand can 
amount to more substantial shift relative to the base case of existing policies. At $140 per barrel 
petroleum price, the shift ranges from as low as two percent at a low ethanol price to an increase 
of about two-thirds at a high ethanol price. If, instead, the petroleum price is assumed to be $70, 
then the increase in the quantity demanded at a given ethanol price ranges from six percent to 
over 90 percent. At high ethanol prices, ethanol demand is sustained in this case by a 
combination of additive and mandated uses which are both very insensitive to further price 
increases.  
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Figure 6. Ethanol demand without state-level support policies and with broader support policies, 
$140 per barrel petroleum price 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Ethanol demand without state-level support policies and with broader support policies, 
$70 per barrel petroleum price 
 
 
 These results can be assessed in terms of the vertical distance, too. In this fashion, the 
results answer the question, at what benchmark ethanol price (Omaha rack rate price) would the 
given quantity sell under different sets of state policies to support ethanol demand? The answer 
depends on the petroleum price as well. For example, if the petroleum price is $140 per barrel, 
then to sell 13 billion gallons of ethanol, the benchmark price would have to be no higher than 
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$1.78 per gallon in the base case (Table 8). In the case of less support, the price would have to be 
lower, at $1.72, in order for consumers to buy the same volume. On the other hand, with broader 
state support for ethanol use, the benchmark price could be as high as $3.04 per gallon and 13 
billion gallons would still be used. At $70 per barrel petroleum, the ethanol price would have to 
be lower to sell the same quantity. Thus, to sell 13 billion gallons of ethanol when petroleum is 
less expensive would require a benchmark price of $1.00 in the base case, $0.94 without any state 
support to demand, and $2.26 if there were widespread state support for ethanol in the form of 
tax discounts and mandates. Smaller quantities would be purchased at higher prices, even rising 
beyond the levels explored here in some cases. In order for greater and greater volumes of 
ethanol to be sold, these prices must be lower. The differences become smaller as the volumes 
increase, much as the quantity differences outlined above largely evaporated at low prices.  
 
Table 8. Ethanol prices at which given volumes of ethanol can be sold 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) indicates a combination of price and quantity not calculated here.  
Source: calculations based on model results as described in text. 
 
 A key assumption about state mandates in the results above is that they are not relaxed 
under any condition. The results for high ethanol price conditions presented above, and the 
results following section as well to a certain extent, depend on this assumption. If states relax 
their mandates at some point as the price of ethanol rises relative to the gasoline price, then the 
mandates would not shift demand outward as much in these conditions.  
V. National ethanol and commodity market implications 
National model and state policy scenarios 
The stylized state ethanol demand representation is useful for exploring the structure of 
demand and how state policies to support ethanol demand may shift that relationship. However, 
this model does not extend far enough to study the broader implications in terms of the impact of 
these policies on ethanol markets taking into account the ethanol processing sector and, through 
that sector, the effects on agricultural commodity markets. To assess these effects, the vertical 
shifts in ethanol demand that are described above are introduced into a broader model system 
that is simulated to estimate the effects.  
The model of ethanol markets is documented elsewhere.15 This US commodity and 
biofuel model includes equations that represent ethanol supply, demand, imports, and price-
                                                 
15 FAPRI–MU “Model of the US Ethanol Market”. FAPRI–MU Report #07-08. July 2008 
(http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/outreach/publications/2008/FAPRI_MU_Report_07_08.pdf). 
Ethanol demand Ethanol benchmark price required to sell given quantity
in billion gallons Petroleum price $70 per barrel Petroleum price $140 per barrel
Base No policy All policy Base No policy All policy
7 $3.28 $2.76 * * * *
9 $1.94 $1.80 * $3.26 $3.00 *
11 $1.34 $1.28 * $2.36 $2.28 *
13 $1.00 $0.94 $2.26 $1.78 $1.72 $3.04
15 $0.66 $0.62 $1.00 $1.24 $1.20 $1.72
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clearing; ethanol processor returns, ethanol capacity, and capacity utilization; corn market supply 
and demand, including uses for ethanol, feed, and exports; and supply, demand, and market 
clearing for distillers grains and solubles. Other major field crops are also included, as is biodiesel. 
National level policies are represented, including the multi-level mandates to use biofuels as 
delineated in the Energy Independence and Security Act.16 
The outcomes are sensitive to the wider context, particularly the petroleum price but also 
with respect to federal policies. The base data are from the FAPRI–MU 2008 baseline update.17 
These numbers were developed at a time when petroleum prices were projected by Global 
Insight to be near $115 per barrel for the next few years. The ethanol price was projected to be 
about $2.45 per gallon. 
The results of the scenarios conducted with the representation of ethanol demand 
described in preceding sections of this paper are introduced into the model of US ethanol 
demand as follows. At these prices, the effect of an elimination of state support for demand is 
about a -3.4 percent reduction in the quantity of demand or, $0.06 change in the average price if 
expressed in terms of a vertical shift. Most of this change is associated with the elimination of 
mandates and a less part is caused by the elimination of preferential tax treatment. Thus, the 
effect is introduced as a -3.1 percent shift in the quantity of demand and an increase of $0.01 in 
the consumer price.  
The scenario of widespread state support for ethanol demand is similarly introduced. E10 
and E85 tax reductions of $0.10 and a 5 percent mandate by energy, or almost 8 percent in 
volume terms, are imposed in those states that offer less support. At $115 per barrel petroleum 
and $2.45 per gallon ethanol, the effect is almost 40 percent higher quantity demand or, if 
expressed as a vertical shift, about $1.30. Assuming the same allocation between mandate and tax 
effects leads to a shift in demand of 34 percent and a reduction in consumer ethanol price of 
$0.13 per gallon.  
The structure of demand in the national model is exploited for this purpose in that the 
price change associated with a scenario is applied universally for all demand categories and the 
quantity shift is added to the part of demand that represents less elastic uses.18  
The scenario starts in marketing year 2009/2010. 
Ethanol and agricultural commodity market effects 
These shifts are an initial effect. The final effect depends on the extent to which demand 
changes affect the wider market. Stronger demand triggered by greater state support for ethanol 
use will tend to bid ethanol prices higher, neutralizing some part of the initial effect. Likewise, 
reduced state support for ethanol would lead to lower ethanol demand and, consequently, lower 
ethanol price, with this price decrease offsetting in part the initial reduction in support. Moreover, 
through ethanol processors, the effects on ethanol prices will have further effects on agricultural 
commodity markets. 
Market effects are shown for averages of 2009/10 to 2012/13 (Table 9). These averages 
overstate the initial price effects and understate the area effects of the first year if the policy 
changes were anticipated. After more years of adjustment, there would be somewhat more supply 
                                                 
16 Analysis of federal biofuel policies using this model is available in “Biofuels Impact of Selected Farm Bill 
Provisions and other Biofuel Policy Options”, FAPRI–MU Report #06-08. 
17 FAPRI–MU “Baseline Update for US Agricultural Markets”. FAPRI–MU Report #10-08. September, 
2008. (http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/outreach/publications/2008/FAPRI_MU_Report_10_08.pdf) 
18 In fact, state level mandates are already reflected in the model based on rough calculations. The 
implementation of scenarios in this paper uses this value as a starting point, but apply the shift calculated 
from the demand representation defined here.  
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response and, consequently, slightly smaller price effects. Nevertheless, these averages usefully 
represent medium-term market effects.  
The implications of removing all existing state mandates and differential tax treatment in 
support of ethanol use are modest. A slightly lower ethanol producer price leads to less ethanol 
processing, with output down by half a percent, on average, or -0.13 billion gallons. This change 
is manifested in corn markets as lower demand. Thus, the average farm corn price is lower, by -
$0.01 per bushel, and the amount of area planted to corn is also reduced, by -0.16 million acres in 
aggregate, on average. Of this, the reduction of Corn Belt area planted to corn is -0.06 million 
acres following a similar decrease in the corn price in this region. 
 
Table 9. National market effects of state ethanol demand policies, average 2009/10-2012/13 
 
 
The net effect on ethanol price to consumers requires some explanation. The demand 
effect is implemented in two initial effects, one for the quantity impact associated with the 
mandate elimination and one for the price effect of eliminating differential taxes. Of these, the 
quantity shift is more important. The net effect is that the reduced quantity of demand at any 
given price associated with no mandated uses in these states causes price to fall. This reduction in 
price more than offsets the slight increase in average price associated with the removal of tax 
reductions. Thus, the net effect on the prices ethanol consumers pay is small, and even somewhat 
negative. 
If all states and the District of Columbia chose to provide at least a certain level of tax 
reduction for ethanol-blend fuels and to mandate some use, then the ethanol price to consumers 
Base No state support for demand Widespread state support
Level Difference form base Level Difference form base
absolute relative  absolute relative
Ethanol
Disappearance (billion gallons) 15.01 14.85 ‐0.16 ‐1.0% 17.30 2.29 15.3%
Production (billion gallons) 14.60 14.49 ‐0.12 ‐0.8% 15.87 1.26 8.7%
  of which, corn‐based ethanol (billion gallons) 14.25 14.13 ‐0.12 ‐0.8% 15.48 1.23 8.6%
Imports (billion gallons) 0.46 0.42 ‐0.04 ‐8.3% 1.51 1.05 227.1%
Price to consumers (dollars/gallon) 2.63 2.62 ‐0.01 ‐0.3% 2.51 ‐0.11 ‐4.3%
Price to corn‐based ethanol processors (dollars/gallon) 2.43 2.41 ‐0.02 ‐0.7% 2.65 0.22 9.1%
Corn
National area planted (million acres) 93.07 92.91 ‐0.16 ‐0.2% 94.68 1.61 1.7%
  of which, Corn Belt area planted (million acres) 40.49 40.43 ‐0.06 ‐0.2% 41.16 0.67 1.6%
Production (billion bushels) 13.63 13.61 ‐0.02 ‐0.2% 13.87 0.25 1.8%
  of which, Corn Belt production (billion bushels) 6.83 6.82 ‐0.01 ‐0.2% 6.94 0.12 1.7%
Domestic disappearance (billion bushels) 11.69 11.66 ‐0.03 ‐0.3% 12.03 0.34 2.9%
  of which, used for fuel alcohol (billion bushels) 5.12 5.08 ‐0.04 ‐0.8% 5.56 0.44 8.6%
Exports (billion bushels) 1.94 1.95 0.01 0.5% 1.84 ‐0.09 ‐4.9%
Farm price (dollars/bushel) 5.26 5.25 ‐0.01 ‐0.2% 5.40 0.14 2.7%
  Corn Belt farm price 5.32 5.31 ‐0.01 ‐0.2% 5.46 0.14 2.7%
Selected other crops
US area planted
  Soybeans (million acres) 72.06 72.14 0.08 0.1% 71.21 ‐0.85 ‐1.2%
  Wheat (million acres) 58.54 58.56 0.02 0.0% 58.34 ‐0.20 ‐0.3%
  Sorghum (million acres) 6.92 6.91 0.00 ‐0.1% 6.97 0.06 0.8%
  Barley (million acres) 4.34 4.34 0.00 ‐0.1% 4.38 0.03 0.8%
Corn Belt area planted
  Soybeans (billion bushels) 32.04 32.10 0.05 0.2% 31.50 ‐0.55 ‐1.7%
  Wheat (billion bushels) 3.42 3.42 0.00 0.1% 3.38 ‐0.04 ‐1.1%
  Sorghum (billion bushels) 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.1% 0.15 0.00 ‐0.6%
  Barley (billion bushels) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.0% 0.01 0.00 0.0%
US farm price
  Soybeans (dollars/bushel) 11.60 11.60 ‐0.01 ‐0.1% 11.68 0.08 0.7%
  Wheat (dollars/bushel) 6.69 6.68 ‐0.01 ‐0.1% 6.78 0.08 1.2%
  Sorghum (dollars/bushel) 4.95 4.94 ‐0.01 ‐0.2% 5.04 0.09 1.9%
  Barley (dollars/bushel) 5.18 5.17 ‐0.01 ‐0.2% 5.29 0.11 2.1%
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could be reduced by -$0.11 per gallon, on average, and the price to corn-based ethanol producers 
could be increased by $0.22 per gallon. While this increase gives a signal to increase domestic 
production capacity, half of the 2.3 billion gallon increase in ethanol use would be met by greater 
imports at least during the medium-term. Ethanol production would account for about 1.3 
billion gallons of the increase in use, implying greater demand for corn, so the average farm price 
of corn rises by $0.14 per bushel. Average corn area planted is simulated to rise by about 1.6 
million acres in this case, including 0.7 million acres in the Corn Belt given the $0.14 higher corn 
price there. 
The effects of ethanol policies spill over not only into the corn market, but also into other 
agricultural commodity markets. The changing price of corn leads affects land use mostly 
through reallocation among competing land uses, rather than by drawing new land into crop 
production in the US. Nationally, more than half of the additional land planted to corn is 
reallocated from soybean use, and another 12-13 percent is from wheat. In the Corn Belt, over 80 
percent of the additional land used for corn in either scenario was previously used to grow 
soybeans, and 6 percent was used for wheat. Substitution in demand uses, for example among 
grains used in feed and also in food uses, also causes other market prices to move as corn markets 
adjust to the changing demand on the part of ethanol processors. The relative effects reflect not 
only the area shifts, but also the degree of substitution in demand and also the overall 
responsiveness of various agents, including foreign buyers, to price changes. If state support to 
ethanol demand is eliminated, there are broad decreases in farm prices but of no greater 
magnitude than the effects on corn price. With widespread state support for ethanol use, farm 
prices of other crops rise by $0.08 to $0.11 cents per bushel. At each step, however, the results 
are moderated in part by limits to substitutability, of land among its various uses or of 
commodities in demand, so effects tend to be more and more muted in each market.19  
VI. Limitations of the study 
 The representation of ethanol demand is stylized. While the data may be too sparse for 
an estimated model at this point, further research should illuminate better the price links and the 
fundamental nature of consumer behavior to allow more exact representation. 
 The results are also context-specific. The assumption about petroleum price is 
particularly important, and exogenous to these models. A higher petroleum price leads to greater 
demand for ethanol and decreasing likelihood that a mandate requiring at least a certain level of 
use will prove binding. Conversely, a lower petroleum price increases the probability that 
mandates will affect market outcomes.  
                                                 
19 Livestock, meat, milk, and milk product markets are not considered. There would be effects, but they are 
judged to be modest based on the magnitude of crop market changes, and not simulated here. On the other 
hand, effects on world crop and crop product markets through trade are represented using reduced form 
equations that reflect how total demand for US crop exports and supplies to US crop importers responds to 
changes in US markets. 
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Appendix 1: Data sources 
Table 10. Base period data sources 
 
Category Variable SOURCE DATE OF SOURCE DATE OF DATA
2007 base tax rates
Gasoline  excise tax rates Federation of Tax Administrators (http://www.taxadmin.org/FTA/rate/motor_fl.html). January, 2006 January, 2006
Gasohol excise tax rates Federation of Tax Administrators (http://www.taxadmin.org/FTA/rate/motor_fl.html). January, 2006 January, 2006
2004 policy: preferential tax treatment
E10 tax rate benefit rel to gas Infer from http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/progs/ddown_matrx2.cgi March, 2007 Varies by state
E85 tax rate benefit rel to gas Infer from http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/progs/ddown_matrx2.cgi March, 2007 Varies by state
E10 tax abs benefit rel to gas Infer from http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/progs/ddown_matrx2.cgi March, 2007 Varies by state
E85 tax abs benefit rel to gas Infer from http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/progs/ddown_matrx2.cgi March, 2007 Varies by state
2004 data on ethanol use
Share of ethanol in blends of  E10L Calculated from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs04/xls/mf21.xls. October, 2005 2004
Share of equiv  E10L in sum of E10L + E0
2004 policy: mandates
Mandate E10 or E85 use in 2004 Binary 1=YES American Coalition for Ethanol, "StatUS: 2006; ACE State by State Ethanol Handbook", 2006. Early 2006 See mandate date
 Minimum share by volume American Coalition for Ethanol, "StatUS: 2006; ACE State by State Ethanol Handbook", 2006. Early 2006 See mandate date
 Minimum share in equiv Calc na 2004
2004 policy: label requirements
Label Req as minimum content for label American Coalition for Ethanol, "StatUS: 2006; ACE State by State Ethanol Handbook", 2006. Not known, other data labeled 2004. Not known, other data labeled 2004.
  
Extrapolation
2004 to 2007 FINAL growth factor
2007 policy: mandates
Mandate use in 2007 Binary 1=YES American Coalition for Ethanol, "StatUS: 2006; ACE State by State Ethanol Handbook", 2006. Early 2006 See mandate date
 Minimum share by volume American Coalition for Ethanol, "StatUS: 2006; ACE State by State Ethanol Handbook", 2006. Early 2006 See mandate date
 Minimum share in equiv Calc na 2004
For extrapolating to 2007, MTBE replacement
Retail deliveries Conventional  EIA (EIA, pet_cons_refmg_a_EPM0U_VTR_mgalpd_m.xls). 2006 2004
Retail deliveries Oxygenated  EIA (EIA, pet_cons_refmg_a_EPM0X_VTR_mgalpd_m.xls). 2006 2004
Retail deliveries Reformulated  EIA (EIA, pet_cons_refmg_a_EPM0R_VTR_mgalpd_m.xls). 2006 2004
Assumed ethanol content in conventional  Unknown
 oxygenated  EIA 2006 2006
 reformulated  EIA; Gallagher, Otto, Dikeman, 2000 2006; 2000 2006; ?
Implied avg eth content  Calc 2004
Share of ethanol in blends of  E10L Calc Assume 2007
Share of equiv  E10L in sum of E10L + E0 Calc Assume 2007
2004 Base data for prices and quantities
Price Reg Gas no tax Calculated na 2004
Price Ethanol Whlsle no tax na na na
Price Ethanol Retail no tax na na na
Quantity Fuel Use Highway, not specialty http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs04/xls/mf21.xls October, 2005 2004
Quantity E10 fuel http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs04/htm/mf33e.htm April, 2006 2004
Quantity E10L fuel http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs04/htm/mf33e.htm April, 2006 2004
Quantity E85 fuel Calc na 2008
Quantity E0 fuel Calc na 2004
Q gas equivalent E10 fuel Calc na 2004
Q gas equivalent E10L fuel Calc na 2004
Q gas equivalent E85 fuel http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/atftables/afv_hist_data.html Feb, 2008 2008
Q gas equivalent E10L+E0 fuel Calc na 2004
Q gas equivalent All fuel Calc na 2004
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Appendix 2: Sources for state-level tax treatment for ethanol blended fuels 
Sources of state taxes incentives for ethanol use are not consistent. For the purposes of 
this study, three sources are used. The Federal Tax Administration gives a relatively clear list of 
relative tax rates that is not reproduced here. Supplemental information from the American 
Coalition for Ethanol and the Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy office of the US DOE 
are combined with a view to estimate the upper bound of state support. Thus, a tax reduction 
listed in either source is applied, even if it is not listed in both or all sources. 
 
Table 11. Sources of tax reduction information 
 
State Source Quote or passage Note
Arkansas EERE
"Excise taxes on alternative fuels are imposed on a gasoline 
gallon equivalent basis."
Hawaii ACE
"Fuel blends containing at least 10 percent ethanol are exempt 
from the 4 percent state excise tax on retail sales of gasoline."
May have expired by time of 
writing.
Idaho ACE
"E10 receives a 2.5 cent per gallon exemption from the state’s 
excise tax on gasoline." EERE also notes tax reduction.
Illinois ACE "No tax applies to sales of E85." Sales tax from www.state.il.us.
Iowa ACE and EERE Stated reductions vary by source.
Kansas EERE States minimum $0.17 tax rate for E85. Compared to $0.24 for 
gasoline reported by FTA.
Maine ACE
"E10 receives a tax exemption of approximately 2 cents per 
gallon … . E85 receives a tax exemption of approximately 6.4 
cents ...."
Michigan EERE
"A tax of $0.12 per gallon is imposed on gasoline containing at 
least 70% ethanol …"
Compared to $0.19 for 
gasoline reported by FTA.
Minnesota ACE "E85 receives a 5.8 cent per gallon exemption…"
Montana EERE
"A state road tax reduction of 15%, as compared to the tax on 
gasoline, is available to consumers for using gasohol. Gasohol 
is defined as a gasoline fuel that is blended with denatured 
ethanol."
Assumed to apply to E85 at 
same rate.
New Mexico EERE "The excise tax imposed on alternative fuel distributed in New 
Mexico is $0.12 per gallon."
Compared to $0.186 for 
gasoline reported by FTA. 
Assumed to apply to E85.
New York EERE
"E85, compressed natural gas, and hydrogen used exclusively 
to operate the engine of a motor vehicle is exempt from state 
sales and use taxes."
Sales tax from 
www.tax.state.ny.us.
North Carolina EERE "The retail sale, use, storage or consumption of alternative 
fuels is exempt from the state retail sales and use tax..."
Sales tax from 
www.taxfoundation.org.
North Dakota EERE
"Sale of ethanol blended gasoline fuel containing 85% ethanol 
(E85) is exempt from the $0.23 per gallon tax, and is instead 
subject to a reduced tax of $0.01 per gallon on all E85 fuel sold 
or used in the state, up to 1.2 million gallons."
Upper limit is ignored.
Oklahoma ACE
"1.6 cent per gallon tax credit for each gallon of ethanol 
blended gasoline sold at the retail level."
Pennsylvania EERE
"The rate of tax is determined on a gasoline gallon equivalent 
basis."
South Dakota EERE "E85 and M85 are taxed at a rate of $0.10 per gallon, and 
other ethanol blends are taxed at a rate of $0.20 per gallon. "
Compared to $0.22 for 
gasoline reported by FTA.
Wisconsin EERE
"A state excise tax, based on the standard number of British 
thermal units per gallon generated by each alternative fuel, is 
imposed on the use of alternative fuels."
Use gasoline equivalence as 
defined in paper.
Sources
  FTA = Federation of Tax Administrators. Accessed via www.taxadmin.org/FTA/rate/motor_fl.html.
  ACE = American Coalition for Ethanol. "ACE Ethanol Handbook." 2006.
  EERE = Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy office of the US Department of Energy. 
                          Accessed via www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/ethanol/incentives_laws.html.
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Appendix 3: Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD) composition 
The states in each of the five PADDs are reproduced here for convenience. In the text, PADD 2 
is referred to as the Midwest.  
 
Table 12. PADD composition 
 
 
 
 
PADD PADD PADD
Connecticut 1 Illinois 2 Alabama 3
Delaware 1 Indiana 2 Arkansas 3
District of Columbia 1 Iowa 2 Louisiana 3
Florida 1 Kansas 2 Mississippi 3
Georgia 1 Kentucky 2 New Mexico 3
Maine 1 Michigan 2 Texas 3
Maryland 1 Minnesota 2
Massachusetts 1 Missouri 2 Colorado 4
New Hampshire 1 Nebraska 2 Idaho 4
New Jersey 1 North Dakota 2 Montana 4
New York 1 Ohio 2 Utah 4
North Carolina 1 Oklahoma 2 Wyoming 4
Pennsylvania 1 South Dakota 2
Rhode Island  1 Tennessee 2 Alaska 5
South Carolina 1 Wisconsin 2 Arizona 5
Vermont 1 California 5
Virginia 1 Hawaii 5
West Virginia 1 Nevada 5
Oregon 5
Washington 5
 
